A first approach to Judge Wilk's decision that doesn´t look like what you usually read

FIRST APPROXIMATION TO THE JUDICIAL JUDGMENT OF THE CUSTODY PROCEDURE OF JUDGE WILK AND APPEAL.

Judge Wilk's custody decision, in which he decided on the lawsuit filed by Woody Allen against Mia Farrow to obtain custody of Moses, Satchel and Dylan, is one of the documents cited repeatedly when commenting on the matter of the allegations of abuse of Dylan Farrow. In this first approach we will try to clear up some doubts and correct some errors.
The first thing that needs to be known is that we are in a child custody procedure in which one of the parents, Mia Farrow, has been holding uninterrupted and consensual custody of children since birth or adoption. Allen and Farrow never shared a home, never lived together and the children were always with their mother. Therefore, it is not the case of a normal couple in which the two live together and jointly hold custody until the day of separation; It is an extraordinary case in which only one parent has had custody of the minors while the other parent has never had custody. It is fundamental to understand this point, because the attribution of custody is always done preferentially to the parent who has already held it in a peaceful manner. Therefore, Allen's claim had very little or no chance of thriving under normal conditions and could only have prospered if it could be proved that Mia Farrow was behind the accusation of abuses against him.
Therefore, the attribution of custody to Mia Farrow was the normal termination of the procedure.
Let's see below some of the essential pronouncements of the Judgment.
Regarding the Custody.
CUSTODY
Section  240(1)  of  the  Domestic  Relations  Law  states that in a custody dispute, the court must "give such direction  .
.  . as  . . . justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of  the  case  and  of  the  respective  parties  and  to  the  best interests of the child."
The  case  law  of  this  state  has  made  clear  that  the governing  consideration  is  the  best  interests  of  the  child.
Eschbach  v.  Eschbach,  56  NY2d  167  (1982);  Friederwitzer  v. Friederwitzer,  55 NY2d 89  (1982). The  initial  custodial  arrangement  is  critically important.  "Priority,  not  as  an  absolute  but  as  a  weighty factor, should, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, be accorded  to  the  first  custody  awarded  in  litigation  or  by voluntary agreement."  Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 NY2d 242, 251  (1977).
"[W]hen children have been living with one parent for a long period  of time  and  the parties have previously  agreed  that custody  shall  remain  in  that  parent,  their  agreement  should prevail and custody should be continued unless it is demonstrated that the custodial parent is unfit or perhaps less fit  (citations omitted)."  Martin v. Martin, 74 AD2d 419, 426  (4th Dept 1980).
After  considering  Ms.  Farrow's  position  as  the  sole caretaker of the children, the satisfactory  fashion  in which she has  fulfilled  that  function,  the  parties'  pre-litigation acceptance  that  she  continue  in  that  capacity,  and  Mr.  Allen's serious  parental  inadequacies,  it  is  clear  that  the  best interests  of  the  children  will  be  served  by  their  continued custody with Ms. Farrow.
The attribution of custody to Mia Farrow has nothing to do with allegations of abuse. The application of the general criteria of custody makes it totally unnecessary for the judge to enter into supplementary considerations, and he does not. Woody Allen is not deprived of custody for considering proven, or probable, allegations of sexual abuse.

Regarding the existence or not of evidence about the sexual abuse of Dylan Farrow by Woody Allen.

Judge Wilk concludes in this regard:
Mr. Allen's relationship with Dylan remains unresolved. The  evidence  suggests  that  it  is  unlikely  that  he  could  be successfully  prosecuted  for  sexual  abuse.  I  am  less  certain, however,  than  is  the  Yale-New  Haven  teamthat  the  evidence proves conclusively that there was no sexual abuse.

That is to say, the evidence indicates that it would not be possible to prosecute him with possibilities of success and the judge is not sure that the evidence conclusively proves that there were no abuses.
The judge does not doubt if the evidence goes so far as to prove that the abuses took place, what is doubtful is that the evidence proves completely and conclusively that the abuses did not occur. That means that the evidence points strongly to the fact that the abuses did not occur, but the judge understands that it is not possible to prove it so that there can be no doubt about it.
This conclusion, clearly stated in the judgment, is often overlooked and replaced by the conclusion reached by Judge Wilk regarding the possibility of Mia Farrow fabricating Dylan's allegations. Recall what the sentence states:
There  is  no  credible  evidence  to  support  Mr.  Allen's contention that Ms. Farrow coached Dylan or that Ms. Farrow acted upon a desire  for revenge against him  for seducing Soon-Yi.  Mr. Allen's resort to the stereotypical "woman scorned" defense is an  injudicious  attempt  to divert  attention  from his  failure to  act as a responsible parent and adult.

We will not enter at this moment to analyze if this statement is justified in the light of what we know, but we will limit ourselves to pointing out the fallacy to which it tries to lead us (with great success in a large part of the cases) the fact of repeating it constantly out of context. The fallacy is this: if the judge considers that Mia Farrow did not address Dylan, then it is that Dylan's statements are true and abuses occurred.
This reasoning is incorrect and leads to a badly incorrect conclusion. The first error is in the same starting point: it is not true that there were only two possible explanations of Dylan's behavior, there were three:
In developing our opinion, we considered three hypotheses to explain DyIan's staternents. First, that Dylan'-s statements were true and that hit, Allen had sexually abused her; second, that Dylan´s statements were not true but were made up by an emotionally vulnerable child who was caught up in a disturbed family and who was responding to the stresses in the family; and third, that Dylan was coached or inuenced by her mother, Ms. Farrow.
The second error is that this conclusion is presented, omitting Wilk's pronouncement on abuses completely. Thus, we want to convey the impression that the judge completely discards Mia Farrow's coaching and, therefore, considers it practically certain that abuses took place, when the truth is that the judge said that the evidence points to the fact that they did not exist abuses (although they do not prove it definitively) and that he discards coaching. The joint interpretation of these two statements implies that the judge considers that there is a high likelihood that the cause of Dylan's statements was an emotionally vulnerable one who was caught up in a disturbed family and who was responding to the stresses in the family.
In any of the cases, Wilk has already clearly described his conclusions regarding the existence of the abuses (he is not entirely sure that the evidence conclusively proves that they did not occur) and it is not possible to try to change that clear conclusion with an interpretation Regarding what the judge says about something else - the coaching of Mia Farrow - In Claris non fit interpretatio.

The Yale New and Haven Report the testimonies of Doctors Coates and Schultz

Again, we will not analyze Wilk's position on the Yale New Haven report at this time in depth. It is well known and has been widely publicized. What is less known is that the appellate court, through a ruling of May 12, 1994, corrected Judge Wilk's ruling in that specific aspect and expressly stated that his findings should be taken into consideration:
Unlike the court at IAS, we do not consider the conclusions reached by Doctors Coates and Schultz and by the Yale-New Haven team, to be totally unpersuasive. While the tendency of Dylan to withdraw into a fantasy and the inconsistencies in her account of the events of August 4, 1992, noted particularly by the Yale-New Haven team, must be taken into account in the evaluation of these serious allegations (…)

This is the final judicial assessment of the Yale New Haven report and the Doctors, conducted by the superior court of Judge Wilk, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Department. The Yale New Haven Report is recognized and valued, especially in what refers to the inconsistency in Dylan's statements. The inconsistency in Dylan's narrative is expressly recognized in the appeal judgment.

The inappropriate behavior of Woody Allen with Dylan Farrow

Again without commenting on the matter at this time in detail, there is an essential question regarding the so-called inappropriate behaviors of Allen with Dylan: that they had no sexual component. This is admitted and recognized by Judge Wilk through the testimony of Dr. Coates
What follows are my findings of fact.  Where statements or observations  are attributed  to witnesses,  they are adopted by me as findings of fact.
(…)
I  understood  why  she  was worried,  because  it [Mr.  Allen's  relationship  with  Dylan]  was intense,  . . I  did  not  see  it  as sexual,  but  I  saw  it  as  inappropriately intense  because  it  excluded  everybody  else, and  it placed  a demand  on a child  for a kind of  acknowledgment  that  I  felt  should  not  be placed on a child  . . .

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