ABOUT WOODY ALLEN AND THE CASE OF ABUSES ONE THING I'M ALMOST SURE YOU DON´T KNOW

WOODY ALLEN AND THE DECISION OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, FRAN MACO, NOT TO INITIATE A PENAL PROCEDURE AGAINST HIM FOR THE ALLEGED ABUSES TO DYLAN FARROW 


On September 24, 1993 Frank Maco, Connecticut State Attorney, appeared before the media to announce his decision not to take action against Woody Allen for the alleged abuse of his seven-year-old daughter, Dylan Farrow, on day four. of August, 1992. In the context of this appearance Maco made the statement by which he became famous and practically the only one that has transcended from that decision:

A state's attorney in Connecticut said yesterday that he had "probable cause" to prosecute Woody Allen on charges that he sexually molested his adopted daughter, but had decided to spare her the trauma of a court appearance.


This statement will be repeated every time reference is made to the decision not to take a criminal action against Woody Allen, causing the impression that the prosecutor considered that he had sufficient evidence that Allen had abused Dylan but did not undertake the criminal prosecution so as not to force harm to the girl by forcing her to testify. Frank Maco himself has encouraged this interpretation every time he has had access to a means of communication. However, the reality is more complex and the true reasons alleged by Maco actually lead to a totally different conclusion from the one that causes the first impression of the press conference.


The full text of the official communication from the Office of the State Prosecutor adds essential information to better understand the facts, fundamentally in the paragraphs transcribed below

The arrest warrant application contains evidentiary information the majority of which was subject matter in the New York Supreme Court custody trial of Allen vs. Farrow. To the extent that the evidence of the sexual abuse allegations were considered in Justice Wilk's decision of June 7 1993, I feel that I have benefited from his observations as to the probative force of that evidence, keeping in mind the different standards of proof between a custody trial as compared to a criminal prosecution. This decision should not be viewed as condoning the activities of Mr. Allen which Justice Wilk termed “grossly inappropriate", but as a recognition of the degree of proof necessary to establish those acts as "criminal". For even Justice Wilk, in doubting the success of a criminal prosecution and working in the framework of an evidentiary standard less severe than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could not definitely conclude that sexual abuse had occurred. (Note: Athough Justice Wilk was not as certain as the Yale-Clinic that abuse did not occur).
(…)
My review dealt ultimately with determining the existence of proof necessary to establish a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt. While arguably such a case may exist considering the allegations in the warrant application, I acknowledge that the nature of the evidence (as mentioned earlier within this decision, the majority of which was considered in the New York Supreme Court] is fertile ground for defense attacks and would not have the same probative force as it did in the New York Supreme Court custody case.


Therefore, we know that the prosecution did not have - in essence - evidence other than that which had been analyzed in the custody procedure and that in the case of custody the judge did not conclude that there was abuse, so the prosecutor is aware that:

  • There are different criteria for admission and assessment of the evidence in a custody procedure and in a criminal procedure.
  • The first difference is that the criminal proceedings must prove the facts beyond a reasonable doubt, however, in the custody procedure is enough that the judge considers them tested, although there may be a reasonable doubt.
  • The second is that the evidence analyzed and assessed by Judge Wilks in the custody procedure would not have the same probative force in the criminal jurisdiction. That is to say, that in the criminal jurisdiction there are more strict admission and evaluation criteria for the evidences than in the civil jurisdiction in general, and in the case of custody in particular.


That is, Frank Maco and the Office of the State Prosecutor are affirming that in the case of custody, evidence has been analyzed and valued that would be invalid in the criminal trial and that has been assessed without taking into account the presumption of innocence. Despite this, the judge did not have the conviction that the abuses had occurred. Franf Maco believes that, if even in these circumstances the judge did not consider that the abuses had taken place, to take a criminal action would  subject the child to the rigors of a very uncertain criminal proceeding.

In short, it is not that the prosecutor waived Allen's criminal prosecution for not victimizing the girl but thinking that he had sufficient evidence against him; he was aware that he did not have them.

In future entries we will analyze, also briefly, other implications of this document.

WHAT EVIDENCE OF THE JUDGMENT OF CUSTODY REFERRED FRAN MACO BY SAYING THAT IT HAD NO PROBATORY FORCE?


A FIRST APPROACH TO JUDGE WILK'S DECISION THAT DOESN´T LOOK LIKE WHAT YOU USUALLY READ

THE SUPPOSED AND IMPROBABLE REFUTATION THAT JESSICA WINTER MAKES OF BOB WEIDE

THE TESTIMONY OF DYLAN FARROW

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